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Introduction
Our Republic is founded with the idea that the people can hold our
government accountable. But what happens when a private entity runs an
entire public utility system? In Texas, the majority of citizens are under the
electricity grid run and operated by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas
(ERCOT), a non-profit entity.1 It is the only electricity grid in the United
States that is immune to much if any federal regulation. The state of Texas
has prided itself on creating a self-sufficient electricity grid, disconnected
from the other major power grids across the United States. Since the
electricity does not ingress or egress outside the bounds of the state, it is able
to avoid federal regulation.
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1. Chris Tomlinson, ERCOT made the February Freeze fiasco worse. Texas electricity
needs greater oversight, Houston Chronicle (Oct. 17, 2021, 9:43 PM), https://www.houston
chronicle.com/business/article/Tomlinson-Grid-manager-made-February-freeze-16168537.
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Instead, the Texas electricity grid is overseen by a state agency, the Public
Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT), which ensures compliance with the
Public Utility Regulatory Act, “… adopts and enforces rules… and has
oversight and enforcement authority over ERCOT Protocols, Operating
Guides, and Other Binding Documents.”2 After years of deregulation and
lawsuits, ERCOT continues to run into problems of grid capacity, reliability,
and accountability to consumers and the general public. Accountability turns
into stacked boards, appointed representation, and industry puppets, with the
public’s interests being ignored and warnings pushed aside for private profits;
in February of 2021 in Texas, this has resulted in nearly 200 deaths with no
entity for recourse and accountability.
Public Electricity Regulation
There has long been a history of public electricity regulation; ERCOT is
an anomaly.
A Regulatory History
The rest of the country is regulated by one of two federal regulatory
commissions: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) or the
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). FERC is an
independent agency that regulates interstate transmission of natural gas, oil,
and electricity.3 It monitors energy markets and sometimes conducts market
abuse investigations.4 Although FERC covers the geographic area near
Texas, it has limited jurisdiction over ERCOT because the majority of Texas
under ERCOT’s grid is not connected to the interconnections of other states.
The other federal regulatory agency, the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC), draws its membership from the electric industry and
sets standards for reliable operation and planning of electrical systems and
enforces compliance with federal standards.5 Both federal regulatory agencies
were created after the largest blackout in United States history, which took
place in the Northeastern United States in November of 1965.6 NERC was
created in response to the 1965 blackouts as a “voluntary membership
2. Compliance in ERCOT, ERCOT (Oct. 17, 2021, 9:46 PM), http://www.ercot.com/
mktrules/compliance.
3. The Steering Committee of Cities Served by ONCOR and The Texas Coalition for
Affordable Power, The Story of ERCOT (Feb. 2011), http://tcaptx.com/downloads/THESTORY-OF-ERCOT.pdf.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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organization devoted to the creation of standards, guidelines, and criteria to
ensure grid security.”7
Prior to this blackout, grid security was more of a local or regional issue,
and federal oversight was a new concept in this industry. In 1935, "[President
Franklin D. Roosevelt] signed the Federal Power Act, which tasked a
regulatory agency called the Federal Power Commission with overseeing
electricity sales that crossed state lines.”8 Subsequently, the electricity
industry operations followed criteria and guidelines for reliable operations
developed by the North American Power Systems Interconnection
Committee (NAPSIC), a utility organization, and other reliability planning
guides from other regions throughout the United States.9 After the blackout,
however, the “National Electric Reliability Council (NERC) was established
by the electric utility industry… [and] [n]ine regional reliability organizations
were formalized under NERC.”10 NAPSIC became part of NERC, bringing
the reliability roles of operations and planning together in one organization,
and NERC adopted NAPSIC operations criteria and guides.11
Texas Moves Toward Deregulation
After the Federal Power Act was passed, Texas began taking steps toward
deregulation. The legislation had “required the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to break up public utility holding companies into their
constituent properties unless they could function as an integrated and more
efficient whole.”12 Public utility companies in Texas thus had to decide
between electrical integration or autonomy. In light of this reality, “the
principle utilities in Texas… elected to isolate their properties from interstate
commerce… ,” thus maintaining their independence and avoiding federal
regulation due to interstate commerce.13 This federal oversight of the
electricity industry through the passing of the Federal Power Act, coupled
with the subsequent consolidation of federal agencies, led the state of Texas

7. Id.
8. Noah Kim, Why does Texas have its own power grid?, Houston Chronicle (Oct. 17,
2021, 10:14 PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/politics/texas/politifact/article/Factcheck-Why-does-Texas-have-its-own-power-15964085.php.
9. Milestones: NERC Reliability Standards, NERC (May 19, 2014), https://www.
nerc.com/pa/Stand/Resources/Documents/Milestones_NERC_Reliability_Standards.pdf.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Cudahy, The Second Battle of the Alamo: The Midnight Connection, Natural
Resources & Environment (Vol.10, No. 1, 1995).
13. Id.
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to form the Texas Interconnected System (“TIS”), the precursor to ERCOT.14
ERCOT was created to oversee the Texas grid five years later, in 1970.15 In
1975, the Public Utilities Commission of Texas was created; until that time,
ERCOT had operated without even state oversight.16 These acts all lead up to
the state’s ultimate goal of deregulating the electricity industry in Texas. The
shift occurred in 1978, when Congress passed the Public Utility Regulatory
Policy Act, which “… allowed for competition in the generation of electric
power”17 Consequently, Texas began to consolidate its internal state
regulatory agencies; TIS transferred its operating functions to ERCOT in
1981.18
The autonomy of public utilities companies in Texas was tested after an
incident in 1976 known as the “midnight connection.” It all began when an
Oklahoma attorney filed a claim with the SEC against Central and
Southwestern Corporation (CSW), a public utilities company with constituent
properties in both Texas and Oklahoma, among other states in the region.19
Representing municipal and cooperative electric distribution systems in
Oklahoma, the attorney claimed “CSW was not in compliance with the
integration requirement of [the Federal Power Act of 1935],” because two of
the constituent properties in Texas were disconnected from their Oklahoma
counterparts and “operated synchronously with ERCOT.”20 This incident led
to highly contested litigation between CSW and Oklahoma public utility
interests in the case West Texas Utilities Co. v. Texas Elec. Service in 1979.
This case, at its core, dealt with the issue of whether it was in violation of the
Sherman Act for an electricity utility “to confine its facilities solely within a
single state” under the Federal Power Act.21 The court ruled that the Texas
utility company, including the group of utility companies acting in concert,
14. The Steering Committee of Cities Served by ONCOR and The Texas Coalition for
Affordable Power, The Story of ERCOT (Feb. 2011), http://tcaptx.com/downloads/THESTORY-OF-ERCOT.pdf.
15. Noah Kim, Why does Texas have its own power grid?, Houston Chronicle (Oct. 17,
2021, 10:14 PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/politics/texas/politifact/article/Factcheck-Why-does-Texas-have-its-own-power-15964085.php.
16. The Steering Committee of Cities Served by ONCOR and The Texas Coalition for
Affordable Power, The Story of ERCOT (Feb. 2011), http://tcaptx.com/downloads/THESTORY-OF-ERCOT.pdf.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Cudahy, The Second Battle of the Alamo: The Midnight Connection, Natural
Resources & Environment (Vol.10, No. 1, 1995).
20. Id.
21. West Texas Utilities Co. v. Texas Elec. Service Co., 470 F. Supp. 798, 814 (1979).
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was not in violation of the Sherman Act to operate only within the state, but
Congress may eliminate the option to not participate in interstate operations
under the Federal Power Act if it so desires.22 Since Congress has not acted
on this option to change the law, the court found the actions of many Texas
utilities legal.23 Since the court ruled on the validity of these utility
companies’ intrastate operations, ERCOT and utility companies under its
authority have continued to operate under the Federal Power Act without
federal oversight.
ERCOT: Its Function and Disfunction
With all the recent attention given to this entity, many Texas residents take
for granted the unique function and disfunction of ERCOT and its wholesale
energy market that manages their electricity each day.
What Is ERCOT?
ERCOT has created a near monopoly in the management and operations of
electricity in the state of Texas. That is because ERCOT manages its own
electricity grid within the state of Texas, and thus has an internal
interconnection. The majority of the State’s electricity grid is outside of the
other two major electricity grids in the United States, the Western
Interconnection and the Eastern Interconnection, demonstrated in Figure 1.24

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Maps, ERCOT (Nov. 6, 2021, 3:17 PM), http://www.ercot.com/news/mediakit/
maps.
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Figure 1. ERCOT electricity grid interconnection in relation to other two
interconnections in the United States.25
Only a small portion of the state of Texas is not a part of the ERCOT
interconnection, including El Paso and far west Texas, and portions of East
Texas and the Panhandle region, as noted in Figure 1.26 Thus, ERCOT
manages the flow of electricity for more than 90 percent of the state and
supplies to over 26 million customers.27 “ERCOT schedules power on an
electric grid that connects more than 46,500 miles of transmission lines and
[over] 710[] generation units,” and its membership includes “consumers,
cooperatives, generators, power marketers, retail electric providers, investorowned electric utilities, transmission and distribution providers and
municipally owned electric utilities.”28 “ERCOT’s primary job is to manage
an algorithm that raises and lowers electricity prices based on supply and
demand,” thus enabling the majority of Texas’s electricity grid to run under

25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
About ERCOT, ERCOT (Oct. 17, 2021, 9:48 PM), http://www.ercot.com/about.
Id.
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what they call a “wholesale energy market.”29 ERCOT was put in charge of
the wholesale energy market in 1999.30
The Competitive Wholesale Market and Resiliency
After Rick Perry became Governor of Texas in 2000, he oversaw this
transition from the traditional electric utility system to the competitive
wholesale market.31 The idea behind this system was to allow the market to
regulate electricity prices in the state. Customers would get power from these
private entities under ERCOT’s operations, and when generators were needed
in times of energy shortages, the increased prices would incentivize
consumers to diminish energy use and thus stabilize the grid.32 The system is
built on scarcity; when electricity is in high demand and reaching full
capacity, “bonus” power prices kick in, in hopes of disincentivizing power
use and conserving energy.33 To further incentivize reduced electricity use
during shortages, such as during the heat of summer or during winter weather
outbreaks, ERCOT pays industrial users to cut off their power through
contractual agreements.34 Natural gas producers are the biggest energy users
in Texas, and thus constitute many of the industrial users which have made
these contractual agreements to cut off their power during energy shortages;

29. Chris Tomlinson, ERCOT made the February Freeze fiasco worse. Texas electricity
needs greater oversight, Houston Chronicle (Oct. 17, 2021, 9:43 PM), https://www.houston
chronicle.com/business/article/Tomlinson-Grid-manager-made-February-freeze-16168537.
php.
30. Chris Tomlinson, Texas electric grid is an easy fix, if lawmakers will admit their
error, Houston Chronicle (Oct. 17, 2021, 9:50 PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/
business/columnists/tomlinson/article/Texas-electric-grid-is-easy-to-fix-if-lawmakers-15961
368.php.
31. Chris Tomlinson, ERCOT made the February Freeze fiasco worse. Texas electricity
needs greater oversight, Houston Chronicle (Oct. 17, 2021, 9:43 PM), https://www.
houstonchronicle.com/business/article/Tomlinson-Grid-manager-made-February-freeze-161
68537.php.
32. Id.
33. Shelby Webb, Expect more conservation notices as ERCOT, PUC announces plan
to overhaul Texas electricity market, Houston Chronicle (Oct. 17, 2021, 9:53 PM),
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/PUC-ERCOT-announce-plansto-overhaul-electricity-16332551.php.
34. Chris Tomlinson, ERCOT made the February Freeze fiasco worse. Texas electricity
needs greater oversight, Houston Chronicle (Oct. 17, 2021, 9:43 PM), https://www.
houstonchronicle.com/business/article/Tomlinson-Grid-manager-made-February-freeze-161
68537.php.
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but, the grid relies on natural gas to keep working.35 Herein lies the first
major problem with how ERCOT is operated.
This issue, however, is nothing new to ERCOT. In fact, ERCOT has
ignored thirteen years of warnings from state regulatory authorities.36
Authorities, including the Texas House Select Committee on Electric
Generation Capacity and Environmental Effects, had been warning ERCOT
of the potential repercussions for not having sufficient backup power if
energy shortages arose since a Committee report published in January of
2009.37 “Texas is the only American electricity grid with no rules for
resiliency,” and relies instead on price incentives to decrease power usage
during power shortages.38 The Texas state legislature had appointed an
investigative committee over this issue in 2012, but ERCOT continued to
ignore its advice to set resiliency standards.39 Even in recent years, the grid
has continued to show need for concern. In 2018 and 2019, “Texas’s
electricity reserve margins dropped below target levels in 2018 and 2019,
stirring a lot of debate about reliability and higher prices.”40 This resiliency
concern for the electricity grid powering most of the state has been
anticipated and building for years, and ERCOT has yet to incorporate any of
the proposed resiliency rules, which are common for the industry. Other
electricity grids throughout the United States, under the regulation of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, are required to weatherize pipelines
and equipment, as well as have weatherized backup generators, in case of
power shortages due to inclement weather.41 ERCOT has yet to adopt similar
standards.

35. Id.
36. Chris Tomlinson, Texas electric grid is an easy fix, if lawmakers will admit their
error, Houston Chronicle (Oct. 17, 2021, 9:50 PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/
business/columnists/tomlinson/article/Texas-electric-grid-is-easy-to-fix-if-lawmakers-15961
368.php.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Chris Tomlinson, Evolving Texas grid marks the beginning of the end of fossil fuel
electricity, Houston Chronicle (Oct. 17, 2021, 9:55 PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/
business/columnists/tomlinson/article/Evolving-Texas-grid-marks-beginning-of-the-end-158
27233.php.
41. Chris Tomlinson, Texas electric grid is an easy fix, if lawmakers will admit their
error, Houston Chronicle (Oct. 17, 2021, 9:50 PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/
business/columnists/tomlinson/article/Texas-electric-grid-is-easy-to-fix-if-lawmakers-15961
368.php.
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In fact, ERCOT’s system is created to rely not on backup generators and
weatherized equipment, but on the free market, and a program called its
“emergency response program.” The emergency response program was
created to balance power demand and supply the electricity grid.42 It
functions so that “[w]hen demand exceeds supply, ERCOT can call on heavy
industrial power users that have signed contracts to reduce electricity
consumption,” but these statistically constitute many natural gas producers,
which are needed to keep the electricity grid functioning.43 Those who have
opted in to these contracts, more than 400 heavy power users, are required to
“install an automatic circuit switch or manually shut down operations when
there are less than 1,750 megawatts of spare power on the grid.”44 The issue
becomes, when an electricity shortage occurs during something like a winter
storm, ERCOT’s policy to shut down those industrial powers which have
“opted in” to the emergency response program does not take into
consideration the kinds of companies which have opted in. Therefore, the
natural gas on which the electricity grid relies is unavailable when the grid
needs it the most. TXOGA, an oil and gas trade group, “has pushed for
enhanced communication between ERCOT and the industry, and called for
mapping of critical natural gas facilities,” as there are no criteria for those
companies participating in the emergency program.45 During the winter storm
of 2021, “ERCOT forced 67 power plant fuel facilities offline, including five
natural gas facilities that later requested they be exempt from power outages
because they were critical to Texas’ electricity grid,” because they do not
have protocols in place to identify which facilities they shut off in times of
emergency.46 This has been identified as a major cause of the February 2021
winter storm blackout in Texas.
The February 2021 Winter Storm
Across the country, Americans were astonished to turn on the news and
see the devastation that hit the state of Texas in February of 2021. Rolling
blackouts in the height of a severe winter storm left Texas residents without
electricity, warmth, and safety. The winter storm, however, was not the
42. Paul Takahashi, ERCOT’s emergency response program needs better oversight,
Houston Chronicle (Oct. 17, 2021, 9:56 PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/
texas-inc/article/Insight-ERCOT-s-emergency-response-program-16319739.php.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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highlight of the news, but the entity which failed to properly prepare for the
storm: ERCOT.
Community Impact
The February 2021 winter storm brought to light the reality of the
concerns ERCOT had been warned of and had been ignoring for the last
thirteen years, and this has sparked public criticism and calls for change. At
the height of the February 2021 winter storm, more than half of the power
capacity in the state of Texas went offline, resulting in nearly 200 deaths47
“More than 4.5 million customers were without power at one point during the
week” of the storm.48 In addition, the blackouts resulted in over $195 billion
worth of property damage.49
Contributing Factors
According to a Report by the University of Texas at Austin’s Energy
Institute, there was no single cause to trace back to the failure of the
electricity and natural gas systems from the February 2021 winter storm.50
However, the Report’s committee was able to isolate several factors that
contributed to the blackout. First, the committee determined that not just
natural gas, but “all types of generation technologies failed,” including coal
power, nuclear reactors, wind generation, and solar generation, as shown in
Figure 2 below.51

47. James Osborne, ERCOT President pushes tough new rules to overhaul Texas power
grid, but challenges lie ahead, Houston Chronicle (Oct. 17, 2021, 9:58 PM), https://www.
houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/ERCOT-president-pushes-reform-16309949.
php.
48. Erin Douglas and Mitchell Ferman, ERCOT board members who live outside of
Texas are resigning in the aftermath of the power outage, winter storm, Texas Tribune (Oct.
17, 2021, 9:59 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/23/ercot-members-resign-texas/.
49. The University of Texas at Austin Energy Institute, The Timeline and Events of the
February 2021 Texas Electric Grid Blackouts (Nov. 6, 2021, 3:00 PM), https://energy.
utexas.edu/ercot-blackout-2021.
50. The University of Texas at Austin Energy Institute, The Timeline and Events of the
February 2021 Texas Electric Grid Blackouts 7 (Nov. 6, 2021, 4:18 PM), https://energy.
utexas.edu/sites/default/files/UTAustin%20%282021%29%20EventsFebruary2021TexasBla
ckout%2020210714.pdf.
51. The University of Texas at Austin Energy Institute, The Timeline and Events of the
February 2021 Texas Electric Grid Blackouts 8 (Nov. 6, 2021, 4:18 PM), https://energy.
utexas.edu/sites/default/files/UTAustin%20%282021%29%20EventsFebruary2021TexasBla
ckout%2020210714.pdf.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol8/iss1/9

2022]

How to Hold ERCOT Accountable to Texas Residents

215

Figure 2. Net capacity outages by fuel type in Texas
during the February 2021 winter storm.52
Natural gas was a major contributor to the failure of the electricity grid, but as
indicated in Figure 2, wind generation also significantly contributed to
outages. On February 15, 2021, grid conditions deteriorated rapidly, leading
to blackouts, and forcing ERCOT to shed load to avoid a total grid
blackout.53The grid’s condition meant that it did not have enough electricity
to generate the demand during the severe weather. Because of this, to prevent
the grid from becoming overwhelmed and damaged, things such as rolling
blackouts, or the kind of opt-in programs present under ERCOT kick in to
artificially decrease demand and create grid stability. These rolling blackouts
or opt-in programs prove critical to prevent grid breakdown, because grids
operate using an alternating current that must run, or alternate, 60 times a

52. ERCOT Public, Update to April 6, 2021 Preliminary Report on Causes of
Generator Outages and Derates During the February 2021 Extreme Cold Weather Event,
April 27, 2021, http://www.ercot.com/content/wcm/lists/226521/ERCOT_Winter_Storm_
Generator_Outages_By_Cause_Updated_Report_4.27.21.pdf.
53. The University of Texas at Austin Energy Institute, The Timeline and Events of the
February 2021 Texas Electric Grid Blackouts 8 (Nov. 6, 2021, 4:18 PM), https://energy.
utexas.edu/sites/default/files/UTAustin%20%282021%29%20EventsFebruary2021TexasBla
ckout%2020210714.pdf.
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second, or 60 Hz of frequency to operate efficiently and effectively.54 This
frequency is what drops and rises as supply and demand shift; they are
inversely related.55 ERCOT’s goal is to shed the load in order to maintain the
grid’s frequency of 60 Hz and to sustain its maximum capacity without
having to shed the load, because it keeps the grid running efficiently while
keeping electricity costs steady and profitable for shareholders.
Weather Forecasting and Grid Capacity
In addition to electricity generation failures, the committee cites the
weather itself as a significant contributor, as indicated in Figure 3 below.

Figure 3. Net capacity outages in Texas by cause
during the February 2021 winter storm.56

54. Jordan Wirfs-Brock and Leigh Paterson, IE Questions: What Keeps Our Electricity
Grid Humming? (Oct. 12, 2021, 2:08 PM), http://insideenergy.org/2015/07/10/ie-questionswhat-keeps-our-electric-grid-humming/.
55. Id.
56. ERCOT Public, Update to April 6, 2021 Preliminary Report on Causes of
Generator Outages and Derates During the February 2021 Extreme Cold Weather Event,
April 27, 2021, http://www.ercot.com/content/wcm/lists/226521/ERCOT_Winter_Storm_
Generator_Outages_By_Cause_Updated_Report_4.27.21.pdf.
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However, this does not leave ERCOT without fault in the matter. While
“weather forecasts failed to appreciate the severity of the storm,” ERCOT
underestimated demand for severe weather conditions generally.57 In fact,
ERCOT “… underestimated demand relative to what actually happened by
about 9,600 MW, about 14%.”58 ERCOT plans for seasonal peak loads to try
to prevent blackouts from occurring, but in February 2021, the planned
generator outages were higher than the planned scenarios predicted by the
controllers.59 In a single 24-hour period during the February 2021 winter
storm, the grid lost 24,600 MW between the major power sources
contributing to the grid.60 Notably, the outages were not significantly higher
than predicted.61 In January of 2021, ERCOT released its extreme weather
predictions in a report, ranging from mild to severe weather and a forecast for
each year, by comparing the 2011 severe weather scenario to other weather
predictions; this forecast includes 2021, shown on Figure 4 below.

57. The University of Texas at Austin Energy Institute, The Timeline and Events of the
February 2021 Texas Electric Grid Blackouts 8 (Nov. 6, 2021, 4:18 PM), https://energy.
utexas.edu/sites/default/files/UTAustin%20%282021%29%20EventsFebruary2021TexasBla
ckout%2020210714.pdf.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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Figure 4. ERCOT Forecast based on yearly weather predictions,
including severe weather in 2021.62
Even in consideration of the most severe weather predictions, the 24,600
MW lost in one 24-hour period during the 2021 February winter storm
amounted to about a third of the grid capacity lost in a single day. This lack
of grid capacity in large part due to inadequate predictions and planning
indicates a lack of grid reliability stemming not just from a lack of weatherrelated anticipatory planning, but of the system as a whole.
Another factor concerning the weather was that “some power generators
were inadequately weatherized,” and in fact, “the outage…. of several
power plants occurred at temperatures above their stated minimum
temperature ratings.”63 Therefore, even if the weather was properly
anticipated, ERCOT had not adequately weatherized the equipment to
sustain even expected winter weather conditions.
Even if ERCOT forecasted its needed capacity more accurately, based on
weather patterns and other contributing data, there is a narrow line between
62. ERCOT, 2021 ERCOT System Planning Long-Term Hourly Peak Demand and
Energy Forecast (Jan. 8, 2021, 8:02 PM), https://www.ercot.com/files/docs/2021/01/06/
2021_LTLF_Report.pdf.
63. The University of Texas at Austin Energy Institute, The Timeline and Events of the
February 2021 Texas Electric Grid Blackouts 9 (Nov. 6, 2021, 4:18 PM), https://energy.
utexas.edu/sites/default/files/UTAustin%20%282021%29%20EventsFebruary2021TexasBla
ckout%2020210714.pdf.
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what they generate and what they need, or its supply and demand. This is
because, in addition to keeping the needed frequency of 60 Hz, ERCOT
runs on a model by which supply and demand’s equilibrium is essential
economically.
Other Factors
Other factors beyond weather contributed to the blackouts, and “power
plants listed a wide variety of reasons for going offline throughout the
event,” including equipment issues, fuel limitations, transmission and
substation outages, and frequency issues.64 The fuel limitations primarily
concerned failures within the natural gas system. These issues included the
direct freezing of equipment and a “fail[ure] to inform utilities of critical
electricity-driven components.”65 However, even prior to the winter storm,
“natural gas was… being curtailed to some natural gas consumers,
including power plants.”66 Finally, “natural gas in storage was limited,” as
“underground natural gas storage facilities were operating at… maximum
capacity.”67 While both natural gas and wind generation were major
contributors to the lack of power, it is notable that many natural gas specific
issues were identified by the committee’s report. According to a Texas
Reliability Entity (TRE) report, during the 2021 winter storm event, natural
gas was not able to meet demand, but a Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) and North American Electric Reliability Corporation
(NERC) inquiry “concluded that gas shortages were not a significant cause
of the generator problems during the event.”68 Therefore, between the
conclusions drawn by the University of Texas at Austin’s committee report
and the FERC and NERC inquiry, it seems to be that shortages of natural
gas were not as causally linked to the outages as were other issues
associated with the use of natural gas.
Prior Texas Blackouts: A Comparison
While the February 2021 winter storm blackouts were a shock to the
nation, Texas residents have dealt with this before; despite history’s
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. The University of Texas at Austin Energy Institute, The Timeline and Events of the
February 2021 Texas Electric Grid Blackouts 71-2 (Nov. 7, 2021, 2:10 PM),
https://energy.utexas.edu/sites/default/files/UTAustin%20%282021%29%20EventsFebruary
2021TexasBlackout%2020210714.pdf.
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warnings, the state continues to fail to implement necessary change. In
1989 and as recent as February 2011, winter storms in Texas have led to
similar blackouts in the state. In the months leading up to the winter storm
in 1989, the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT) “warned [the
state] of reliability concerns associated with ERCOT’s reliance on natural
gas for energy generation, which [at the time] represented 53% of the
generation mix . . . .”69 This blackout was “smaller in magnitude” than the
February 2021 blackouts, and the financial impacts modest in contrast to
the 2011 and 2021 events.70 However, this event occurred prior to the
implementation of the competitive retail market now at play in the state.71
The February 2011 event, in more recent memory to many Texans,
involved less severe weather than the 1989 and 2021 events, but cut off
approximately one third of the electricity generation in the grid at its lowest
point.72 Despite a less severe blackout, Texas residents demanded for
change. Therefore, “the 2011 session of the Texas legislature passed a law
[now in the Texas Utilities Code] requiring PUCT [the Public Utility
Commission of Texas] to analyze the preparedness of power plants for
extreme weather event[s]….”73 The law, found in Section 186.007 of the
Texas Utilities Code, requires power plants to submit emergency
preparedness reports for both the summer and winter seasons, including
what the emergency operations plan is based on the upcoming year’s
forecasted weather patterns and any recommendations for improvements to
ensure electricity reliability.74 It is notable to consider that “during the 2011
69. The University of Texas at Austin Energy Institute, The Timeline and Events of the
February 2021 Texas Electric Grid Blackouts 70 (Nov. 7, 2021, 2:00 PM),
https://energy.utexas.edu/sites/default/files/UTAustin%20%282021%29%20EventsFebruary
2021TexasBlackout%2020210714.pdf.
70. The University of Texas at Austin Energy Institute, The Timeline and Events of the
February 2021 Texas Electric Grid Blackouts 71 (Nov. 7, 2021, 2:00 PM),
https://energy.utexas.edu/sites/default/files/UTAustin%20%282021%29%20EventsFebruary
2021TexasBlackout%2020210714.pdf.
71. The University of Texas at Austin Energy Institute, The Timeline and Events of the
February 2021 Texas Electric Grid Blackouts 76 (Nov. 7, 2021, 2:00 PM),
https://energy.utexas.edu/sites/default/files/UTAustin%20%282021%29%20EventsFebruary
2021TexasBlackout%2020210714.pdf.
72. The University of Texas at Austin Energy Institute, The Timeline and Events of the
February 2021 Texas Electric Grid Blackouts 71 (Nov. 7, 2021, 2:00 PM),
https://energy.utexas.edu/sites/default/files/UTAustin%20%282021%29%20EventsFebruary
2021TexasBlackout%2020210714.pdf.
73. Id.
74. Public Utility Commission Weather Emergency Preparedness Reports 4 U.C. §
186.007 (2011).
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event, the market structure in ERCOT was similar to today’s market
structure.”75 This market structure has not proven any more effective at
providing grid sustainability. In fact, despite legislative change to
implement weather preparedness, grid conditions and reliability have
worsened.
Financial Interests in the Competitive Wholesale Market
While the cause of this blackout was traced back to ERCOT’s refusal to
implement resiliency suggestions and weatherize pipelines and backup
generators, it is also notable to consider the financial interests at play in the
competitive wholesale market system. Energy prices “[d]uring normal
operations… are set by the offers of power plants, the level of demand, and
any constraints on the system.”76 In recent years, that price has “averaged in
the low tens of dollars per MWh.”77 Since the market runs on price
incentives to decrease energy use during shortages, this means that private
companies benefit financially from shortages if the market incentive does
not in fact change consumer behavior. Thus, in situations like winter
storms, where consumer incentives are not an effective market control, the
grid, which is already unstable due to a power shortage, begins to fail. Not
only does the grid fail, but the market itself fails consumers. During the
February 2021 winter storm event, “the price of electricity spiked to $9,000
per MWh and stayed there by orders of the PUCT, which suspended some
market price setting rules during the electricity blackouts.”78 This immense
spike in electricity cost for the consumer, deviating from the normal amount
per MWh by about $8,990, while in a safe climate, may incentivize a
decrease in energy use among consumers, does not serve the market well
when the average consumer must place safety ahead of cost. Therefore, the
market cannot reasonably recover in this kind of extreme weather situation,
and thus not only fails consumers, but results in widespread blackouts.

75. The University of Texas at Austin Energy Institute, The Timeline and Events of the
February 2021 Texas Electric Grid Blackouts 76 (Nov. 7, 2021, 2:00 PM),
https://energy.utexas.edu/sites/default/files/UTAustin%20%282021%29%20EventsFebruary
2021TexasBlackout%2020210714.pdf.
76. The University of Texas at Austin Energy Institute, The Timeline and Events of the
February 2021 Texas Electric Grid Blackouts 57 (Nov. 7, 2021, 2:00 PM)
https://energy.utexas.edu/sites/default/files/UTAustin%20%282021%29%20EventsFebruary
2021TexasBlackout%2020210714.pdf.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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When the grid is in an electricity shortage and must rely on backup
generators, the system functions so that private companies financially
benefit, and consumers are left with the option to either put themselves in
dangerous positions or pay skyrocketed fees for electricity use.79 Thus,
there seems to be built into this market a financial incentive to run the grid
on shortages. The emergency response generators’ performance was
hampered by “supply constraints, refueling issues, and forced outages”
according to the University of Texas at Austin’s Energy Institute
commission.80 Other generators were turned off completely during the
rolling blackouts, and thus were unable to contribute to the bulk grid.81 The
financial benefits also disincentivizes investment in weatherizing
equipment to prevent shortages, because not only is the investment in these
improvements needed by private companies, but those same companies
have financial incentive to keep the grid working at a more strained
capacity. In fact, according to the Public Utility Commission of Texas’s
data, natural gas prices spiked from less than $10 per MMBTU to over
$400 per MMBTU.82 This led to natural gas producers reporting “windfall
profits.”83 In addition to natural gas producers, the “financial sector firms
that operate in [the] ERCOT energy market also reported large profits” in
the wake of the February 2021 winter storm event.84 Beyond the
competitive market structure itself contributing to the lining of energy
producers’ pockets, the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT) “…
suspended some market price setting rules during the electricity
blackouts.”85 PUCT claimed this was a necessary measure “to account for
load that had been removed due to forced outages from the calculation [of
79. Chris Tomlinson, ERCOT made the February Freeze fiasco worse. Texas electricity
needs greater oversight, Houston Chronicle (Oct. 17, 2021, 9:43 PM), https://www.
houstonchronicle.com/business/article/Tomlinson-Grid-manager-made-February-freeze-161
68537.php.
80. The University of Texas at Austin Energy Institute, The Timeline and Events of the
February 2021 Texas Electric Grid Blackouts 39 (Nov. 7, 2021, 2:45 PM)
https://energy.utexas.edu/sites/default/files/UTAustin%20%282021%29%20EventsFebruary
2021TexasBlackout%2020210714.pdf.
81. Id.
82. The University of Texas at Austin Energy Institute, The Timeline and Events of the
February 2021 Texas Electric Grid Blackouts 10 (Nov. 7, 2021, 3:12 PM) https://energy.
utexas.edu/sites/default/files/UTAustin%20%282021%29%20EventsFebruary2021TexasBla
ckout%2020210714.pdf.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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money owed for services] process” and “… to avoid potentially even higher
electricity prices that would result from the high price of natural gas.”86
Financial Impacts on Texans
However, many Texas residents were still charged exorbitant amounts of
money on their electricity bills, at a rate of 7,400% above the average.87
One man reported in the New York Times that he was charged with a
$16,752 electric bill in the aftermath of the 2021 winter storm event.88
Governor Abbott, in response to many Texans in this situation, “signed an
order to stop companies from sending invoices or bill estimates to
customers” until they were able to determine what solution to move
forward with.89 In March of 2021, the Texas Attorney General announced
that $29 million in electric bills for consumers across the state would be
forgiven in response to this issue, after a major electricity provider in the
state, Griddy Energy, filed bankruptcy.90 In culmination, the February 2021
winter storm blackout proved a few stark realities about the competitive
market system and deregulation: the market was unable to self-regulate
efficiently, state government was forced to get involved, and three major
public utilities were forced to file for bankruptcy.91
This issue may, however, be resolved through recent legislation signed in
June of 2021. In the aftermath of the February 2021 winter storm, the state
86. Id.
87. Shannon Najmabadi, Texans blindsided by massive electricity bills await details of
Gov. Greg Abbott’s promised relief, Texas Tribune (Nov. 7, 2021, 3:26 PM), https://www.
texastribune.org/2021/02/22/texas-pauses-electric-bills/.
88. Giulia McDonnell Nieto del Rio, Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs and Ivan Penn, His
Lights Stayed on During Texas’ Storm. Now He Owes $16,752, The New York Times (Nov.
7, 2021, 3:32 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/20/us/texas-storm-electric-bills.html.
89. Cassandra Pollock, Texas officials block electricity providers from sending bills,
disconnecting utilities for nonpayment, Texas Tribune (Nov. 7, 2021, 3:36 PM),
https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/21/texas-electric-bill-greg-abbott/.
90. Audrey McNamara, Texas attorney general says $29 million in electric bills will be
forgiven, CBS News (Nov. 7, 2021, 3:40 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/texaselectric-bills-29-million-forgiven/.
91. Maria Chutchian, Brazos Electric seeks bankruptcy court ruling on winter storm
energy prices, Reuters (Nov. 7, 2021, 4:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/legal/transaction
al/brazos-electric-seeks-bankruptcy-court-ruling-winter-storm-energy-prices-2021-10-01/.
See also Paula Sambo, Just Energy Seeks Bankruptcy After Texas Loss, Bloomberg (Nov. 7,
2021, 4:02 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-09/pimco-backed-justenergy-seeks-bankruptcy-after-texas-loss. See also Audrey McNamara, Texas attorney
general says $29 million in electric bills will be forgiven, CBS News (Nov. 7, 2021, 3:40
PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/texas-electric-bills-29-million-forgiven/.
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was under pressure for serious change. Governor Abbott, in response, “…
signed into law new legislation that among other things required power
plants, natural gas facilities and other infrastructure to better weatherize
their systems, with penalties of up to $1 million for not complying.”92 This
will hopefully prove to balance financial incentives at play in the
competitive wholesale market, and essentially force the industry’s hand to
invest in resiliency measures to prevent this kind of situation from
happening again. However, this is only one factor in the market, discussed
in more detail later, and other incentives may present equal concern.
ERCOT’s Board Structure and Incentives
Aside from market incentives, ERCOT features a small board of
decisionmakers, each member having their own agenda. ERCOT’s board,
prior to the subsequent resignations in the political aftermath of the
February 2021 blackout, consisted of thirteen members.93 Nine members
were current or former professionals in the energy industry, one member
that worked for the Dallas municipal government, one member represents
industrial customers of ERCOT, and only one member represents
residential consumers—this member representing residential consumers is
appointed by the Governor.94 The last seat was vacant.95 In addition, “[i]n
order for ERCOT to maintain its certification as an independent
organization, the board, which should consist of 16 members, must include
five directors who are completely unaffiliated with ‘any market
segment.’”96
While the nonprofit status of the organization keeps it from complete
industry control, it is still an issue that ERCOT, a private entity, has an
essential monopoly over the electricity grid in Texas. Consumers do not
have another option for electricity typically found in other private markets.
92. James Osborne, ERCOT President pushes tough new rules to overhaul Texas power
grid, but challenges lie ahead, Houston Chronicle (Oct. 17, 2021, 9:58 PM), https://www.
houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/ERCOT-president-pushes-reform-16309949.
php.
93. Chris Tomlinson, Texas electric grid is an easy fix, if lawmakers will admit their
error, Houston Chronicle (Oct. 17, 2021, 9:50 PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.
com/business/columnists/tomlinson/article/Texas-electric-grid-is-easy-to-fix-if-lawmakers15961368.php.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Erin Douglas and Mitchell Ferman, ERCOT board members who live outside of
Texas are resigning in the aftermath of the power outage, winter storm, Texas Tribune (Oct.
17, 2021, 9:59 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/23/ercot-members-resign-texas/.
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And, unlike a publicly owned electricity grid, accountability mechanisms
are minimal. Since ERCOT is a nonprofit organization, and thus a private
entity, it is under the governance of a Board of Directors. This is an issue,
because Governor Abbott is known to be an advocate of the energy
industry.97 Thus, by making the board member designed to represent the
consumers an appointed position, this calls into question whether the
general public is adequately represented. Only one person on ERCOT’s
board is charged with representing 26 million customers.98 Not only did
they have a vacant seat, but many of the members themselves did not even
live in the state of Texas.99
Many of these board members have since resigned in the aftermath of the
February 2021 winter storm. The political fallout of the winter storm led
Governor Abbott to call for board member resignations.100 Six out-of-state
board members resigned, with a seventh member, from Texas, following
suit.101 At the time this comment was written, ERCOT only has four current
board members.102
Holding ERCOT Accountable: The Courts Intervene
In the aftermath of the February 2021 winter storm, Texas residents
demanded accountability. Not only did 48 million customers lose power,
but according to higher estimates, as many as 200 individuals lost their
lives.103104 Over two dozen families attempted to sue ERCOT for the
97. Chris Tomlinson, Texas electric grid is an easy fix, if lawmakers will admit their
error, Houston Chronicle (Oct. 17, 2021, 9:50 PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/
business/columnists/tomlinson/article/Texas-electric-grid-is-easy-to-fix-if-lawmakers-15961
368.php.
98. About ERCOT, ERCOT (Oct. 17, 2021, 9:48 PM), http://www.ercot.com/about.
99. Erin Douglas and Mitchell Ferman, ERCOT board members who live outside of
Texas are resigning in the aftermath of the power outage, winter storm, Texas Tribune (Oct.
17, 2021, 9:59 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/23/ercot-members-resign-texas/.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Board of Directors, ERCOT (Oct. 17, 2021, 10:06 PM), http://www.ercot.com/
about/governance/directors.
103. Erin Douglas and Mitchell Ferman, ERCOT board members who live outside of
Texas are resigning in the aftermath of the power outage, winter storm, Texas Tribune (Oct.
17, 2021, 9:59 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/23/ercot-members-resign-texas/.
104. James Osborne, ERCOT President pushes tough new rules to overhaul Texas power
grid, but challenges lie ahead, Houston Chronicle (Oct. 17, 2021, 9:58 PM), https://www.
houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/ERCOT-president-pushes-reform-16309949.
php.
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wrongful death of a loved one due to “sickness, cold or lack of power for
oxygen machines” caused by the power outages.105 This included the
wrongful death suit of an 11-year-old boy from Conroe, Texas.106 In
addition to the human devastation the power outages caused, the economic
damages were severe, with property damage estimated in the billions.107
However, Texas residents quickly discovered that the entity which they
believed directly and negligently caused this damage and loss across the
state, ERCOT, was not legally able to be held responsible in civil lawsuits.
This is because of a ruling from a Texas Court of Appeals case out of
Dallas dating back to 2018, Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. v.
Panda Power Generation Infrastructure Fund, LLC, also known as Panda
Power I and II.108
Panda Power I and ERCOT’s Sovereign Immunity Status
In the Panda Power cases, the Texas Court of Appeals addressed two
issues, one of which decided the sovereign immunity status of ERCOT.
Sovereign immunity is a legal concept derived from the common law which
prevents a government from being sued without its consent.109 “In the
United States, sovereign immunity typically applies to the federal
government and state government, but not to municipalities.”110 The
purpose of sovereign immunity doctrine is to prevent private entities from
the right to sue governmental entities for civil matters, because this may
hold up taxpayer resources in litigation and prevent its use in the social
services or other functions the government entity is designed to do.
However, in application to ERCOT, a private non-profit organization
operating public electricity utilities in Texas, Texas courts have ruled
inconsistently over the last few years on whether or not the organization
was considered a “governmental unit” for purposes of sovereign immunity
status.
105. Reese Oxner, ERCOT to argue it is immune from winter storm lawsuits, Texas
Tribune (Nov. 13, 2021, 12:51 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/04/09/ercot-lawsuitimmunity-winter-storm/.
106. Id.
107. Paul Takahashi, ERCOT’s emergency response program needs better oversight,
Houston Chronicle (Oct. 17, 2021, 9:56 PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/
texas-inc/article/Insight-ERCOT-s-emergency-response-program-16319739.php.
108. Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. v. Panda Power Generation
Infrastructure Fund, LLC, 552 S.W.3d 297 (2018).
109. Sovereign immunity, Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (Nov. 13,
2021, 1:54 PM), https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/sovereign_immunity.
110. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol8/iss1/9

2022]

How to Hold ERCOT Accountable to Texas Residents

227

In order to qualify for sovereign immunity status, ERCOT must be
considered a “governmental unit” since this status applies to government
entities. In cases prior to Panda Power, ERCOT had argued it was not a
governmental unit. In HWY 3 MHP, LLC v. Electric Reliability Council of
Texas, decided in March of 2015 by the Texas Court of Appeals out of
Austin, ERCOT argued that it was not a governmental unit for purposes of
interlocutory appeal, like in Panda Power, and the court agreed.111
According to Panda Power, the similarities in reasoning between Panda
Power’s argument that ERCOT was a governmental unit for purposes of
interlocutory appeal and ERCOT’s argument in HWY 3 were as follows: the
legislature chose an independent organization as opposed to an agency,
indicating it “did not intend ERCOT to be a governmental unit,” ERCOT
was “not fulfilling [the] same role” as a governmental agency and “has not
been statutorily defined as being part of a governmental unit,” ERCOT “’is
not statutorily entitled to any services or benefits that a typical
governmental unit might receive’ and ‘does not receive funding from the
state,’” and the financial oversight PUCT has over ERCOT is similar to that
of utilities, which are not considered governmental units.112 For these
reasons, the Texas Court of Appeals in Austin ruled that for purposes of
interlocutory appeal, ERCOT was not a governmental unit, and thus
secondarily, ERCOT would be considered outside of the protection of
sovereign immunity from civil suits. This particular case dealt with a breach
of contract dispute between ERCOT and a utility company, and thus, it was
in ERCOT’s interest to be designated not a governmental unit under the
statute at issue.
In the Panda Power cases, however, ERCOT’s interests were to be
labeled as a government unit to avoid civil liability, and thus, the
organization reversed its position. In Panda Power I, ERCOT argued that it
performs a “uniquely governmental function in regulating the electric grid
and aspects of the electricity market,” and therefore falls within the
governmental-unit status in this capacity.113 In furtherance of this assertion,
ERCOT cited University of the Incarnate Word v. Redus, which ruled that
“… an unambiguously private entity that performed a traditional
governmental function was a ‘governmental unit’ as to that function.”
111. HWY 3 MHP, LLC v. Electric Reliability Council of Texas, 462 S.W.3d 204, 212
(2015).
112. Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. v. Panda Power Generation
Infrastructure Fund, LLC, 552 S.W.3d 297, 307 (2018).
113. Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. v. Panda Power Generation
Infrastructure Fund, LLC, 552 S.W.3d 297, 306 (2018).
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Therefore, ERCOT was able to distinguish this case and reconcile its
previous position in HWY 3 to assert a defense against its civil lawsuit with
Panda Power. Ultimately, the court ruled that ERCOT was not a
governmental unit for purposes of an interlocutory appeal.114
However, despite ruling against ERCOT’s governmental unit status, the
court in the Panda Power I case still granted ERCOT sovereign immunity
status against civil lawsuits. The court first reasoned that in order to “…
determine whether an entity is immune, courts should rely on the ‘nature
and purposes’ of sovereign immunity.”115 In reference to ERCOT’s brief in
the case, the court recognizes the following considerations laid out by the
Supreme Court which serve as the bases for sovereign immunity as applied
to ERCOT: (1) “immunity protects the public fisc.,” (2) “separation-ofpowers requires ERCOT’s immunity,” and (3) immunity would protect
critical government services, which may otherwise be “diverted to pay
private litigants” if sovereign immunity were denied.116 Furthermore, even
though ERCOT is not a government agency, it is not considered an
independent contractor for the state either, which are denied sovereign
immunity status in Brown & Gay Engineering v. Olivares.117 In fact,
ERCOT, “unlike any other corporation in Texas, exclusively performs
statutory functions . . . .”118 This ruling out of the Court of Appeals in
Dallas was then appealed by Panda Power via a writ of mandamus to the
Supreme Court of Texas, challenging its dismissal of Panda Power’s
claims.
Panda Power II and Issues of Preemption
In Panda Power II, the Supreme Court of Texas ruled on March 19,
2021, that it lacked the jurisdiction to hear the case, thus calling into
question the fate of the multitude of petitions being filed against ERCOT in
the aftermath of the February 2021 winter storm. ERCOT argued that the
Supreme Court of Texas lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, and in fact,
“the Public Utility Commission ha[d] exclusive jurisdiction over Panda’s
claims.”119 However, when the trial court denied this claim, ERCOT
proposed Panda was barred from filing suit against it because it had
114. Id. at 309.
115. Id. at 314.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 310.
118. Id.
119. Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. v. Panda Power Generation
Infrastructure Fund, LLC, 619 S.W.3d 628, 632 (2021).
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sovereign immunity status.120 Ultimately, the court denies ruling on any of
the claims. The divided court, in a 5-4 decision, stated the court lacked
jurisdiction to hear the case, and it was therefore moot, dismissing the case
altogether.121
Dissenting opinions in the Panda Power II case reiterate the sentiments
of many Texans after the ruling was released: the public wants to know
whether ERCOT is in fact immune from suit.122 However, the dismissal of
the Panda Power II case for want of jurisdiction thus metaphorically punted
the issue of ERCOT’s sovereign immunity status for another day. Or,
according to Justice Blacklock’s concurring opinion in the Panda Power II
case, not another day, but another branch; this issue may be avoided
altogether in the courts in hopes of a legislative or executory solution to
ERCOT’s problems. After the Panda Power decisions, ERCOT’s status as a
governmental unit or not, and thus its sovereign immunity status from civil
lawsuits, such as the wrongful death, property damage, and other civil suits
filed against ERCOT in the aftermath of the February 2021 winter storm
have not been resolved.
Two potential outcomes arise regarding Panda Power II and possible
preemption of any future Texas Supreme Court rulings on this issue. First,
the Supreme Court may consider a challenge to ERCOT’s sovereign
immunity status by taking on another case for which it has proper
jurisdiction. Given the timing of the Supreme Court’s dismissal of Panda
Power’s claims, just one month after the devastating February 2021 winter
storm, it seems unlikely the Supreme Court of Texas would rule on
ERCOT’s sovereign immunity status that quickly. Furthermore, the
concurring opinion indicates even a hesitancy to consider the issue in the
court system altogether. However, it is important to consider that the ruling
in Panda Power dealt with ERCOT and a power company in dispute over
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty in the
context of a business relationship. Here, the outcome affects not a company,
but entire populations reliant on ERCOT’s public utilities, both citizens and
businesses alike; the stakes are far greater and the loss far more personal.
Not only this, but the political fallout after the February 2021 winter storm
may play a role in whether the Texas Supreme Court decides to take on this
question in the future.

120. Id.
121. Id. at 642.
122. Id. at 643.
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The second potential outcome would arise if ERCOT were to operate
outside of Texas state lines in order to trigger federal laws that may impact
ERCOT’s sovereign immunity status. This would trigger preemption issues
if there were any existing federal laws which allow ERCOT to be civilly
sued. Preemption is a legal doctrine which invalidates state laws, or a lower
authority of law, when they conflict with federal laws, or a higher authority
of law, in favor of the higher authority law.123 Since ERCOT is unique in its
function as both a public utility commission and a private non-profit entity,
in comparison to FERC and NERC, which are governmental entities, it is
likely that the federal government would have the opportunity to consider
ERCOT’s sovereign immunity status. If ERCOT’s status were challenged
in the context of a federal court case, the outcome of this case would trigger
preemption in favor of the federal court’s decision if the federal court were
to decide ERCOT’s sovereign immunity status, or even reverse it if the
Texas Supreme Court decides to take on this issue and rules in favor of
ERCOT. Therefore, a federal court decision on ERCOT’s sovereign
immunity status may lead to different outcomes for families and businesses
seeking restitution for the damage caused by ERCOT’s improper
management of the public utility system in February 2021, and any other
loss or damage incurred. However, unless ERCOT expands its operations
beyond the state of Texas, federal courts lack jurisdiction on this issue, and
thus may not trigger preemption to overrule any Texas Supreme Court
decision.
Solutions Underway: Are They Enough?
As ERCOT’s sovereign immunity status is fought in and out of the court
system, there have been some ways residents of Texas and companies
harmed in the aftermath of the February 2021 ice storm have sought
restitution for the damage and loss they endured.
Judicial Solutions
Some Texans have still sought restitution for their losses due to the
February 2021 winter storm’s electricity outages within the court system.
While the Texas Supreme Court has yet to take on the issue of ERCOT’s
sovereign immunity status since its dismissal of the Panda Power cases,
many have begun to sue other related entities for damages, including other
private Texas power companies under ERCOT’s management; this includes
123. Legal Information Institute, Preemption
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/preemption
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companies such as CenterPoint Energy, NRG Energy, Oncor, and CPS
energy.124 This is possible because these companies, unlike ERCOT, do not
have their lack of sovereign immunity status in question in the court
system. However, some plaintiffs are still including ERCOT as defendants
alongside these power companies in hopes the Texas Supreme Court may
decide to rule on the issue and hold ERCOT accountable.125 While this may
provide some financial restitution for the loss endured by many in aftermath
of the February 2021 winter storm, this does not prevent future loss under
ERCOT’s management, which has faced no civil accountability for its
mismanagement of the electric grid.
Legislative Solutions
Texans have further sought to hold ERCOT accountable via legislative
change. In June of 2021, after months of mounting political pressure, Texas
Governor Greg Abbott signed into law Senate Bill 2 and 3 to address the
electric grid failure in the aftermath of the February 2021 winter storm and
ERCOT’s board structure and governance.
Senate Bill 3 (S.B. 3) addresses the issue of grid failure, and proposes
solutions to “preparing for, preventing, and responding to weather
emergencies and power outages; increasing the amount of administrative
and civil penalties.”126 First, the bill addresses a new power outage alert
system, which is to alert Texans “when the power supply in . . . [the] state
may be inadequate to meet demand.”127 Likely in hopes of balancing the
market incentives, the alert system will let Texans know when to conserve
power in order to maintain the needed 60Hz frequency in the electricity grid
and prevent power outages.
In addition, S.B. 3 requires electricity operators under ERCOT to enact
and report on its “weatherization plans, procedures, and operations” within
its facilities to prevent equipment and facilities from being unprepared
during future weather emergencies and power outages.128 This
weatherization plan includes “updates for power generators and
transmission lines to make them better withstand extreme weather,” but

124. Reese Oxner, ERCOT to argue it is immune from winter storm lawsuits, Texas
Tribune (Dec. 28, 2021, 1:07PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/04/09/ercot-lawsuitimmunity-winter-storm/.
125. Id.
126. S.B. 3, 2021 Leg., 87th Sess. (Tex. 2021).
127. Id.
128. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

232

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 8

these changes will not likely take effect until 2022 or later.129 These
measures seek to assure companies place weatherization on their priority
lists and keep up with the needed weatherization standards for adequate
grid function in times of severe weather.
In order to assure companies comply with these weatherization
requirements, S.B. 3 calls for inspections of ERCOT-affiliated facilities,
with a penalty of up to $1 million for non-compliance.130 However,
requirements for oil and gas companies are less severe; weatherization for
natural gas companies which supply power to the grid is only required if the
power supply is deemed “critical” by regulators.131 By creating this
exception to weatherization measures for the oil and gas industry, this raises
a big issue and calls into question the effectiveness of this weatherization
measure outlined in S.B. 3. To put this in perspective, figure 5 (also
referenced as figure 2 above) shows the net capacity outages by energy
source during the February 2021 winter storm.

129. Isabella Zou, Texas power generation companies will have to better prepare for
extreme weather under bills Gov. Gregg Abbott signed into law, Texas Tribune (Dec. 29,
2021, 12:51PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/06/08/greg-abbott-texas-power-gridercot/
130. S.B. 3, 2021 Leg., 87th Sess. (Tex. 2021).
131. Isabella Zou, Texas power generation companies will have to better prepare for
extreme weather under bills Gov. Gregg Abbott signed into law, Texas Tribune (Dec. 29,
2021, 12:51PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/06/08/greg-abbott-texas-power-gridercot/
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Figure 5. Net capacity outages by fuel type in Texas
during the February 2021 winter storm.132
As figure 5 shows, natural gas was the most significant contributor to
generator outages during the February 2021 winter storm. By limiting the
requirements for this industry to only “critical” power sources, a subjective
and inconsistent standard, this increases the odds of further weatherization
breakdowns of generators to supply power during times of severe weather
and creates a less effective solution to weatherization issues under S.B. 3.
In addition to attempting to weatherize critical energy sources, S.B. 3
also provides a solution to the previous problem of shutting off the power to
locations essential to the health and safety of Texas residents. Under the
new program, electricity companies can inform customers how to register
facilities such as hospitals or households that need electricity to run medical
equipment as “critical,” thus preventing the outages of essential health and
safety locations for residents without their control or the power companies’
knowledge.133 This measure seeks to provide ERCOT with more specific
132. ERCOT Public, Update to April 6, 2021 Preliminary Report on Causes of
Generator Outages and Derates During the February 2021 Extreme Cold Weather Event,
April 27, 2021, http://www.ercot.com/content/wcm/lists/226521/ERCOT_Winter_Storm_
Generator_Outages_By_Cause_Updated_Report_4.27.21.pdf.
133. Isabella Zou, Texas power generation companies will have to better prepare for
extreme weather under bills Gov. Gregg Abbott signed into law, Texas Tribune (Dec. 29,
2021, 12:51PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/06/08/greg-abbott-texas-power-gridercot/
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data to better trigger controlled outages when needed to maintain grid
stability during severe weather.
During the February 2021 winter storm, many critical facilities,
including not just residences with essential medical equipment, but energy
facilities helping run the grid itself by providing backup generation, were
shut down because the buy-in process to shut off energy was not analyzed
by ERCOT to determine who had elected into the program. This new
program allows customers to buy-out instead of buy-in, in hopes of saving
lives in the case of another potentially deadly rolling blackout in the future.
While this program provides more data to ERCOT and the power
companies under its management, there is still a chance that, without
properly informing all customers, many critical locations may still lose
power, leading to more fatalities during the next extreme weather scenario.
Another major proposal under S.B. 3 seeks to provide economic stability
to ERCOT’s wholesale energy market. In the aftermath of the February
2021 winter storm, many Texans lucky enough to have power during even
some of the storm were left with exorbitant electricity bills. The Texas
government, in passing S.B. 3, attempted to stabilize the market and
prevent future skyrocketed consumer prices while providing no financial
relief to Texas residents or the electricity companies. S.B. 3 did, however,
provide natural gas utilities and electric cooperatives $6.5 billion ratepayerbacked bonds in return for the state increasing customers’ utility bills to pay
back the bonds.134 The state was attempting to provide a safety net to
balance out what can be a volatile electricity and energy market during
times of severe weather. However, by doing this, the state was protecting
the interests of ERCOT and the energy market over consumers. In fact, the
state denied providing financial relief for those customers left with
electricity bills up to 7,400% above the average amount.135 The Texas
government’s solution to provide financial relief for individuals was
through S.B. 3, which put a pause on these exorbitant invoices for
individuals and instead placed the burden of stabilizing this volatile market
on every Texan for years to come.136 This plan to provide bonds to
companies in the energy market under S.B. 3 will raise electricity bills for
134. Id.
135. Shannon Najmabadi, Texans blindsided by massive electricity bills await details of
Gov. Greg Abbott’s promised relief, Texas Tribune (Nov. 7, 2021, 3:26 PM),
https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/22/texas-pauses-electric-bills/.
136. Cassandra Pollock, Texas officials block electricity providers from sending bills,
disconnecting utilities for nonpayment, Texas Tribune (Nov. 7, 2021, 3:36 PM),
https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/21/texas-electric-bill-greg-abbott/.
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consumers “at least a few dollars each month for the next two decades.”137
Therefore, while this plan may contribute to a slightly more stabilized
energy market under ERCOT’s wholesale energy system, the burden of the
market will continue to fall on the backs of consumers and allow the energy
market to come out stronger than ever.
While S.B. 3 attempts to provide solutions to ERCOT’s wholesale
energy market, consumer safety, and weatherization measures in order to
prevent future grid collapses in the future due to similar extreme weather
conditions, these measures do not get to the root of the issue, and thus
provide inadequate solutions for Texas residents.
Board Governance
In addition to S.B. 3, S.B. 2 was passed to address the internal
governance concerns surrounding ERCOT and its management of the grid.
The Board was created to consist of sixteen members. However, leading up
to the February 20201 winter storm, the Board consisted of only twelve
members: nine members were current or former professionals in the energy
industry, one member that worked for the Dallas municipal government,
one member represents industrial customers of ERCOT, and only one
member represents residential consumers—this member representing
residential consumers is appointed by the governor.138 S.B. 2 seeks to
consolidate the power and decision-making of the Board by reducing its
size down to eleven members.139 Of these members, only nine may vote.140
Additionally, the selection committee consisting of three people may
appoint eight members to the Board.141 The selection committee is
appointed by the governor, lieutenant governor, and the Speaker of the

137. Isabella Zou, Texas power generation companies will have to better prepare for
extreme weather under bills Gov. Gregg Abbott signed into law, Texas Tribune (Dec. 29,
2021, 12:51PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/06/08/greg-abbott-texas-power-gridercot/
138. Chris Tomlinson, Texas electric grid is an easy fix, if lawmakers will admit their
error, Houston Chronicle (Oct. 17, 2021, 9:50 PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/
business/columnists/tomlinson/article/Texas-electric-grid-is-easy-to-fix-if-lawmakers-15961
368.php.
139. S.B. 2, 2021 Leg., 87th Sess. (Tex. 2021).
140. Isabella Zou, Texas power generation companies will have to better prepare for
extreme weather under bills Gov. Greg Abbott signed into law, The Texas Tribune (Jan. 2,
2022, 3:02 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/06/08/greg-abbott-texas-power-gridercot/.
141. Id.
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House.142 The process would include bringing in an outside consulting
firm.143
By consolidating power on the Board to a select few and decreasing the
members on the Board, the bill seeks to put the governance power more in
the hands of state government while still maintaining its private sector
status and thus maintaining its immunity. This Board structure further
prevents Texans from holding ERCOT accountable. Unlike the previous
Board structure, which at least maintained one position held for a
representative of consumers, this Board structure eliminates this
accountability mechanism. Although the state government has more control
and influence under this proposed governance structure, there is no direct
representation of consumers. This consolidation of power allows ERCOT to
continue to function with minimal supervision under the guise of
democratic governance and accountability, and will not lead to the change,
accountability, and representation needed for Texas residents.
A Flawed System
The United States prides itself on its free market system. Yet, not every
system is best designed for the distribution and maintenance of public
goods. Every other state in the United States, except for Texas, has its
power grid connected across state lines, tapping into other grid networks,
and maintaining the necessary 60Hz with much greater ease due to power
sharing between grids. Therefore, because the power travels between states,
it can fall under the federal oversight of either FERC or NERC. These
entities ensure power stability and maintenance of the grid. Texas, however,
utilizes a wholesale energy market, avoiding federal regulation, and placing
a critical public good, the majority of the state’s electricity, in the hands of
an idealistic free energy market. The resulting cost is very real for Texas
consumers.
What fuels this grid is not public resource allocation, safety, or the public
good, but supply and demand. In order to maintain the optimal 60Hz for the
grid to function, ERCOT must incentivize consumers via a volatile energy
market. These incentives do not take into account that a consumer’s use of a
public good, energy, may not always be incentivized by money alone. In
fact, during times of energy crisis, the market forces consumers to choose
between two stark realities: their own safety and security, or their personal
finances. And this problem is not new to Texans. In 1989 and in 2011,
142. Id.
143. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol8/iss1/9

2022]

How to Hold ERCOT Accountable to Texas Residents

237

Texans dealt with similar outages, with the major difference being the
market incentives. The 1989 outage was “smaller in magnitude” than the
February 2021 blackouts, and the financial impacts modest in contrast to
the 2011 and 2021 events.144 The 2011 outage involved less severe weather
than the 1989 and 2021 events, but still cut off approximately one third of
the electricity generation in the grid at its lowest point.145
There have even been power issues during the summer months. Last
year, auto-thermostats were installed in many Texas residents’ homes.
However, unbeknownst to these consumers, electric companies were
making auto-adjustments to their electricity usage—not in order to maintain
the status of the home, but to maintain the status of the grid itself. The
program, called Smart Savers Texas, gave EnergyHub, a company in
business with electricity companies, “permission to adjust participants’
smart thermostats remotely during times of peak energy demand.”146 In
similar style, just like in the case of the opt-in program during winter
storms, this program would automatically diminish power for the sake of
the grid during extreme weather conditions dangerous for Texas residents.
In the summer of 2021, this program would decrease energy usage, such as
toward an air conditioning unit of residents’ homes, during the middle of a
heat wave.147 As evidenced here, these problems are not going away, and
the proposed changes are not going to do enough.
Between unreliable projections and a lack of adequate backup energy,
even alternative solutions can be costly without a significant change to the
incentive structure of the energy market in Texas. For example, the use of
standby generators, while it may offer some temporary stability in times of
crisis, generate for investors, whereas public utilities generate for capacity.
Even in these alternative solutions, the incentives still shift from public
safety and reliability to money in the hands of investors. In addition, the use
of “peakers,” or plants that burn natural gas and convert the fuel into
electric energy, may offer excess energy to be tapped into during times of
144. The University of Texas at Austin Energy Institute, The Timeline and Events of the
February 2021 Texas Electric Grid Blackouts 71 (Nov. 7, 2021, 2:00 PM),
https://energy.utexas.edu/sites/default/files/UTAustin%20%282021%29%20EventsFebruary
2021TexasBlackout%2020210714.pdf.
145. Id.
146. Tyler Sonnemaker, Texas power companies automatically raised the temperature of
customers’ smart thermostats in the middle of a heat wave, Business Insider (Jan. 9, 2022,
8:00 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/texas-energy-companies-remotely-raised-smartthermostats-temperatures-2021-6.
147. Id.
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crisis, but they are generally more expensive, thus continuing to shift the
economic burden onto the hands of consumers. There needs to be a better
solution.
Proposed Solutions
The energy market in Texas, like all other markets in the economy, is
fueled by supply and demand. However, for a public resource such as
electricity, the market has been privatized and thus able to thwart
accountability mechanisms one would find across the rest of the country.
This lack of public accountability has led to a volatile market, spiked prices
in times of crisis, energy running at capacity beyond what can be
reasonably sustained, and consumers searching for change.
The Ideal Solution
The use of the wholesale energy market is unsustainable. Since the
electricity grid must maintain 60Hz to run effectively and prevent blackouts
due to grid instability, an incentive structure based on the free market is
unstable and inefficient. Furthermore, in times of energy shortage due to
extreme weather, an isolated market is inadequately prepared to handle
peaks in demand or sustain these demands for any measurable period of
time—thus, leading to blackouts across the state of Texas.
The ideal solution for ERCOT is to open the door to federal regulation
under FERC or NERC and connect with other electricity grids in
neighboring states to utilize as a back-up for energy during extreme weather
conditions or other times of high demand. This energy-sharing capability
would enable the state to tap into resources of neighboring states that may
not have the same extreme weather or have less strain on their grid in order
to spread the burden across more energy sources. Instead of relying on
standby generators to keep the power on, this would enable widespread
resource allocation.
Furthermore, by allowing federal regulation, FERC or NERC may
require additional weatherization or other policies by which ERCOT must
comply, thus preventing lax regulatory measures and decreasing the risk of
equipment failures and such from continuing to contribute to grid outages
during extreme weather conditions.
State-Level Solutions
In order to provide efficient and safe energy allocation and maintain
effective grid capacity, the incentive structure of the electricity market in
Texas cannot rely solely on supply and demand from consumers. The
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market must be balanced by consumer interests and safety structures. And
when the energy market does fail, as it has in February 2021, Texas
residents need to have a way to hold ERCOT accountable.
Due to the Texas Supreme Court’s refusal to rule on the issue of
sovereign immunity, Texas residents are still not able to hold ERCOT
accountable for grid outages and the resulting harm to their personal safety
and finances. And legislative propositions to change ERCOT’s board
structure further isolate residents from the center of power by eliminating
the one member of the Board which was supposed to represent consumers
and consolidating power further into the hands of an entrenched political
administration that continues to ignore the public’s cries for change.
However, the best state-level solution would be to decentralize the
Board’s power outside of industry moguls and high-level politicians and
give more seats to represent consumer interests. While in theory politicians
may represent the people, S.B. 2, for example, would further consolidate
the power of the Board down to only three Board members, the three of
which are all elected by high-level political officials in the state.148
In addition to changes in the Board governance structure of ERCOT,
bills such as S.B. 3 should be expanded to include oil and gas companies
within their weatherization regulations on an equal basis to other energy
resources; weatherization for natural gas companies which supply power to
the grid is only required if the power supply is deemed “critical” by
regulators under the current bill.149 As mentioned previously, natural gas
was the most significant contributor to generator outages during the
February 2021 winter storm. Therefore, holding natural gas companies to
the same regulatory standards may make a significant impact on how
efficient these regulatory changes are in providing a safer grid and more
reliable electricity market in the state.
Alternative Energy and a Capacity Market
Heavy reliance on the oil and gas industry permeates every facet of
American life. However, energy alternatives may provide some reprieve
from energy shortages during times of weather crisis or peak energy usage.
In particular, the use of nuclear power has been in decline for years, and
only accounts for a small percentage of energy usage in the state. As seen
148. Isabella Zou, Texas power generation companies will have to better prepare for
extreme weather under bills Gov. Greg Abbott signed into law, The Texas Tribune (Jan. 8,
2022, 12:09 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/06/08/greg-abbott-texas-power-gridercot/.
149. Id.
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below in Figure 6, a 2021 Energy Consumption Estimate, nuclear electric
power accounted for only 2,174 MWh (megawatt hour) as opposed to
natural gas-fired electricity generation of 19,327 MWh.150

Figure 6. Texas Net Electricity Generation by Source,
comparing nuclear and natural gas energy usage.151
If the state does not utilize the energy resources outside of its borders and
does not hold oil and gas companies to the same regulatory standards,
diversifying its energy sources by tapping into nuclear energy may provide
a safety net for when its primary energy sources cannot meet capacity
demands.
In addition to tapping into alternative energy sources, the structure of the
market itself may be adjusted to what is called a “capacity market.” A
capacity market allows grid operators to “direct investment a few years
ahead of when electricity needs to be delivered.”152 Like the wholesale
energy market, capacity markets function off of supply and demand in order
to meet capacity. The big difference, however, is that it offers more
reliability. Wholesale energy markets rely on day-to-day supply and
150. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Texas (Jan. 18, 2022), https://www.eia.
gov/state/?sid=TX#tabs-4.
151. Id.
152. Explainer: How capacity markets work, Energy News Network (Feb. 2, 2021, 10:09
AM), https://energynews.us/2013/06/17/explainer-how-capacity-markets-work/.
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demand, whereas capacity markets bid out capacity years in advance. This
enables the management entities to predict what output of energy will be
available and better plan for supply and demand, as opposed to the volatile
day-to-day market under the wholesale framework. ERCOT “does not use a
capacity market to ensure necessary resources will be available. Instead, the
state depends on the promise of higher prices to incentivize generation.”153
The capacity market may be a practical solution for the state because it
allows more market control than a regular energy market but shifts the
incentive to capacity instead of price. This would alleviate the primary issue
with the wholesale energy market: the assumption that consumers’ primary
consideration when utilizing an everyday resource is price. Instead, the
market itself would regulate its output capacity and “create long-term price
signals for all resources.”154 This would allow ERCOT to better manage
and plan resource allocation to prevent future blackouts, even in light of
unexpected weather conditions.
Conclusion
Texans deserve reliable and affordable electricity. However, a volatile
wholesale energy market coupled with ERCOT’s mismanagement have left
residents seeking answers and accountability. Sadly, the Texas Supreme
Court in Panda Power I and II has punted the issue of the sovereign
immunity status of ERCOT, calling to question how Texans may hold
ERCOT accountable for the personal and financial damage caused in the
aftermath of the February 2021 winter storm. Legislative action has not
done enough to hold ERCOT accountable, as it has only sought to further
consolidate power and shift that power from industry insiders to highranking state officials. And efforts to ensure proper planning is in place for
energy producers have not put enough emphasis or incentives for
enforcement upon the oil and gas industry.
The energy market in Texas must shift to a different incentive structure
to provide the necessary change needed to keep both the electricity grid
functioning and residents safe. This includes shifting the power within
153. Robert Walton, California markets in the Lone Star State? Texas regulators
consider ‘quasi-capacity’ market system, Utility Dive (Oct. 24, 2021, 9:18 AM),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/california-markets-in-the-lone-star-state-texas-regulatorsconsider-quasi/608695/#:~:text=Unlike%20other%20grid%20operators%2C%20the,higher
%20price%20|to%20incentivize%20generation.
154. Explainer: How capacity markets work, Energy News Network (Feb. 2, 2021, 10:09
AM), https://energynews.us/2013/06/17/explainer-how-capacity-markets-work/.
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ERCOT’s Board to include consumer voices, holding all energy markets
accountable, dispersing the burden to both resources within the energy grids
of other states and by expanding Texas’s own energy sources, including
nuclear energy, allowing federal regulatory oversight, and finally, moving
from a consumer-price-oriented system to a capacity market to ensure grid
stability for years to come.
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